Europe – Italy – In a ruling of 5 February 2026 (Cases C 364/24 and C 393/24 – Findenato v. Italy), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that restrictions or bans imposed by a state on the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) do not violate the principles of free movement of goods or freedom of enterprise, nor do they infringe the principles of proportionality or equality

The national courts asked the Court of Justice of the European Union whether Article 26c(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/18 (concerning GMOs) complies with EU primary law, in particular the rules governing the internal market, the free movement of goods, the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination, as well as several provisions of the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

In it’s judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed that, under Directive (EU) 2015/412, Member States may request to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs on their territory, provided the authorization holder does not object.

The Court recalls that the free movement of goods is a fundamental principle of EU law. However, the EU legislature enjoys a broad discretion when adopting harmonisation measures under Article 114 TFEU, especially in complex areas such as the placing on the market and cultivation of GMOs. Directive 2015/412, which introduced Article 26c, aims to reconcile the proper functioning of the internal market with greater flexibility for Member States regarding GMO cultivation.

The Court considers that the mechanism laid down in Article 26c does not infringe the free movement of goods. The national prohibitions it allows concern only the cultivation of GMOs and not their marketing or importation. Moreover, such prohibitions may be adopted only with the tacit consent of the authorisation holder, which excludes any unjustified interference with the rights of economic operators.

As regards the principle of non-discrimination, the Court finds that there is no discrimination between farmers in different Member States, even if some States allow GMO cultivation and others prohibit it. The prohibitions apply equally to domestic and imported products. Furthermore, the situations of farmers may legitimately differ depending on national contexts linked to land use and agricultural structures.

Concerning the freedom to conduct a business guaranteed by the Charter, the Court holds that there is no infringement, since prohibitions adopted under Article 26c(1) and (3) depend on the tacit consent of the authorisation holder. Third parties, such as farmers wishing to cultivate GMOs, cannot rely on an autonomous right to use seeds whose cultivation has been lawfully restricted.

The Court also rejects the argument that the provisions are incompatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. It reiterates that such agreements may be relied upon to challenge the validity of EU acts only in exceptional circumstances, which are not present in this case. Furthermore, the validity of one act of secondary law cannot be assessed in the light of another act of the same rank.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the examination of the questions referred has disclosed no factor capable of affecting the validity of Article 26c(1) and (3) of Directive 2001/18 or of Implementing Decision 2016/321 concerning MON 810 GMO maize. It further clarifies that decisions adopted on that basis do not need to be justified by the grounds listed in Article 26b and that national legislation may provide for penalties in the event of non-compliance with the cultivation ban.